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ABSTRACT
Assuming that there is not terminological or conceptual impediment to 
call social and economic rights “human rights”, this paper argues that 
social and economic human rights are normatively different from classical 
civil and political human rights, and that this may have some significant 
institutional implications. Following mainstream opinion, I presuppose 
that both classical liberal rights and socioeconomic human rights are 
bundles of negative and positive “incidents” (concrete rights). My first 
claim is that in both cases negative incidents can plausibly be constructed 
as “deontological constraints.” That means that such constraints must be 
observed even if infringing them could maximize the satisfaction of the 
interests those rights seek to preserve. My second claim is that, contrary to 
classical human rights, the fulfillment of the negative incidents of 
socioeconomic rights, albeit necessary, does not represent a significant 
contribution to their fulfillment. Since in the case of socioeconomic 
human rights positive incidents play such crucial role, there is a relevant 
asymmetry between classical and socioeconomic human rights. The paper 
concludes by showing some institutional implications of this asymmetry.
Keywords: human rights, deontological constraints, social and economic 
rights.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are several arguments for holding that economic and social human 
rights (which, for simplicity, I will call “social rights”) are not “genuine” 
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human rights. In this vein, it could be argued that they are simple goals or 
aspirations; that they count as principles of social justice rather than rights 
we enjoy just because we are human persons; that they are not enforceable 
due to the complexity of their effective implementation; that they are 
unfeasible; and that, as opposed to other human rights, they cannot be 
claimed against courts or enforced by them.1 The contrast is obviously 
with classical civil and political human rights (which I will stipulatively 
call “classical rights”). On this view, only these amount to genuine (human) 
rights.
My aim in this paper is not to argue that social rights are not genuine 
rights as I do not think there is anything like a “true” notion of human 
rights. There may be different kinds of norms, ideals, and moral or political 
principles that can be conveyed in the language of human rights, and this 
can be plausible or defensible, both politically and conceptually. What I 
want to show instead is that, beyond terminology and political use, social 
rights are normatively different from classical rights and that this may 
have some significant institutional implications: while classical rights (or 
relevant aspects of them) can plausibly be conceived as “deontological 
constraints” (in a sense to be explained), social rights (or relevant aspects 
of them) cannot. Although they can be conceived in that way (in the sense 
of there not being any conceptual impossibility), it is not plausible to do so, 
except (perhaps) in very specific or exceptional cases.
Importantly, the concept of human rights I will use throughout the 
paper is philosophical. So I will not be speaking about legal human rights 
such as those enacted at the international body of treaties and declarations. 
Rather, my concern is how we should conceive human rights from the 
viewpoint of strict moral analysis. While the way judges and other national 
or international authorities understand legal human rights may well be 
relevant to building a philosophical view of human rights, such relevance 
is only due to the fact that we want our philosophical theories of human 
rights to keep some reflective equilibrium with the practice, not because 
we are merely describing the practice.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I elucidate the concept 
of “deontological constraint” and provide some examples that show how 
human rights sometimes operate in that way. The key point of a right being 
a deontological constraint is that, in principle, it cannot be violated even if 
it doing so would maximize the satisfaction of the interest the right seeks 
to preserve. Section 3 advances a view about how to understand the 
relationship between classical and socioeconomic rights on the one hand, 
1  For some of these objections, see Cranston (2001); O’Neill (2005).
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and negative or positive rights on the other. I reject the traditional 
identification of classical rights with negative rights and of social rights 
with positive rights, and endorse instead the widely accepted account that 
both classical and social rights are bundles of negative and positive 
“incidents” (concrete rights). Nevertheless, I also claim that in specific way 
the negative incidents of classical rights are more fundamental than the 
negative incidents of social rights. Section 4 focuses on the relationship 
between deontological constraints and classical rights. In this respect, my 
claim is not that only negative rights or classical rights can operate as 
deontological constraints. The point is more nuanced and complex: while 
negative incidents of classical rights can plausibly be (and usually are) 
conceived as deontological constraints, positive incidents of classical 
rights may sometimes function as deontological constraints. In section 5 I 
sustain that the positive incidents of social rights cannot plausibly be 
understood as deontological constraints, except for some very specific 
cases – such as the right to be rescued from imminent death. This completes 
my main argument: there is a normative asymmetry between classical 
rights and social rights because relevant incidents of classical rights (which 
are negative in kind) can plausibly be conceived as deontological 
constraints, while relevant incidents of social rights (which are positive in 
kind) cannot be conceived in such way. In section 6 I explain why the 
alleged asymmetry may have some significant implications in terms of the 
role judges can play in the enforcement of human rights.
2. THE CONCEPT OF DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTRAINT
The notion of rights as deontological constraints (hereafter DC) I will use 
is not necessarily the most common one. In my sense, a moral right works 
as a DC when the fundamental moral reason to fulfill the correlative duty 
is focused on the individual holding that right. If John has a DC right 
against me that I do X, then I ought to do X because (and, in principle, only 
because) he has that right. That he has that right is the (in principle, 
sufficient) reason why I should do X. That a right (and its correlative duty) 
is a DC does not necessarily imply that it is absolute, or a “trump,” or a “side 
constraint.”2 But it does imply that it does not follow a strictly 
consequentialist logic, according to which fulfilling the correlative duty 
would be purely instrumental in achieving (or optimizing) some valuable 
social goal, whether aggregative or distributive.
Let me clarify the idea through some examples. Consider the (human) 
2  See Dworkin (1977) for the concept of rights as “trumps,” and Nozick (1974: 29) for 
the concept of rights as “side-constraints.”
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right not to be tortured and the correlative duty of state officers (or the 
state) to never use torture as a method of obtaining information or 
confessions from detained or accused persons. Since there is broad 
agreement on the absolute (or quasi-absolute) character of this right (and 
of the correlative duty), the example is simple (as we will see, other 
examples may be more complex). Claiming that A has a human right not to 
be tortured means that no state officer is allowed to torture A. This right is 
a DC because the fundamental reason why a state officer is not allowed to 
torture A is that A has a right not to be tortured. Such reason is sufficient to 
justify the prohibition. This implies that the state officer is not allowed to 
torture A, even if torturing A would optimize what we may consider morally 
valuable goals (such as human life). More importantly (and crucially), the 
state officer is not allowed to torture A, even if not torturing A would imply 
that more instances of torture will occur in the future.
The DC feature of some rights can be noted even more clearly with 
another example: the right of innocent people not to be convicted and 
punished. When the judge releases an innocent person, her reasoning is 
not (or should not be) that acquitting this person is instrumental for the 
good of society or for some valuable social goal. The reasonable belief that 
the accused person is innocent is (at least in principle) sufficient reason to 
release her. The innocent must be acquitted. This is the only relevant 
consideration. 
As I said, it is not necessary for a right to be absolute to constitute a DC. 
There could be some threshold of social harm above which the duty not to 
torture or not to condemn an innocent might yield. Even if consequentialist 
considerations (for example, about potential social harm) might be thought 
to be relevant, it may still be correct to say that there is a DC right not to be 
tortured or not to be wrongly convicted. However, at the point where 
considerations of consequence alone become relevant, it would start to be 
doubtful that we are dealing with a right not to be tortured or not to be 
wrongly convicted. Certainly, we might still use the terminology of rights, 
insofar as, in general, the state would have a duty not to torture or to convict 
innocent people. But, beyond terminology, we are dealing with a 
qualitatively different kind of norm, namely: a rule aiming to minimize 
tortures or wrongful convictions. This, in turn, could only be understood 
as part of a more general norm aiming to optimize some more basic value, 
such as the well-being of people or the minimization of suffering (where 
minimizing instances of torture or wrongful convictions would be 
instrumental to the optimization of that value).
There is a third more complex example, which nevertheless illustrates 
the DC feature of some human rights: the right to democratic participation 
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(to vote and be elected). The state violates the right to be elected by, for 
instance, proscribing or coercively preventing a candidate or a party from 
participating in free democratic elections. This is so, even if it were true 
that not proscribing a certain candidate would lead to a deterioration of 
democracy, or to more people being wrongfully proscribed in the future. 
As in the previous examples (actually, more so than in the previous 
examples), this DC character of the right to democratic participation may 
be subject to certain limitations (such as the duty to tolerate the intolerant). 
Where to draw such limitation may of course ben controversial. Yet, if the 
human right not to be proscribed is a DC right, the limit must be more 
demanding than the limit would adopt if we simply wanted to optimize 
political freedom.
In sum, a right to X is a DC right only if we are prepared (at least to some 
extent) to sacrifice the satisfaction of important values (including, 
crucially, the fulfillment of more cases of the right to X) to honor the right 
to X in particular cases. The right not to be tortured or wrongly convicted 
and the right to be allowed to participate in free elections are examples of 
rights that can plausibly be conceived as DC rights.
3. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INCIDENTS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS
The idea that certain rights (typically, classical rights) are DC must not be 
confused with the idea that classical rights are negative rights (rights that 
correlate with duties of omission), whereas social rights are positive ones. 
Let me clarify this point. 
In this respect, I follow ideas from Cecile Fabre and David Bilchitz on 
social rights that capture our common sense intuitions about the 
relationship between the positive-negative distinction vis a vis the 
classical-social distinction (Fabre 1998: 267-270; Bilchitz 2007: 90-91).3 The 
main idea is that human rights are clusters of more specific rights (to which 
I will refer as “incidents,” or “aspects” of a human right).4 Some incidents of 
a human right are negative while others are positive; or, in other words, 
3  Although similar, what I am defending is not exactly Henry Shue’s view. He claims 
that any basic right conceptually involves the existence of negative and positive duties (Shue 
1980: 52-53). I just claim that classical rights (such as the right to political participation) 
usually include positive incidents (such as the right not to be prevented from voting) and 
that social rights (such as the right to subsistence) usually include negative incidents (such 
as not to eliminate the only available means of subsistence). For a discussion on Shue’s view, 
see Cohen 2004.  
4  I borrow the use of the term “incident” from Honoré’s classical work on ownership 
(Honoré 1961).
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some require only abstentions from the state, while others require actions 
and the provision of resources from the state. Even though we may speak 
of a right to free expression (a typical classical right) as an “abstract” right 
(to use Bilchitz’s terminology),5 this abstract human right brings together a 
set of “concrete” rights or incidents, which in practice make up the right to 
freedom of expression. Within this set, there are usually negative rights as 
well as positive rights. Similarly, abstract social rights (such as the right to 
subsistence or to adequate housing) are clusters of incidents that correlate 
with specific duties, including both positive and negative ones.
Now that the complex nature of rights has been clarified, the next step 
is determine the role that negative and positive incidents play in classical 
rights as opposed to social ones. In this respect, I want to highlight an 
important asymmetry that will be crucial for my overall argument. 
I have admitted that both classical and social rights have negative and 
positive incidents that can be violated both by action and omission (by the 
state). The operation of both kinds of rights is symmetrical in the case of 
the violation of a right. For example, the social right to adequate housing is 
violated both when the state evicts members of a community from a certain 
territory over which they have a right and when the state does not provide 
adequate housing to homeless people. In this sense, positive and negative 
incidents of the social right to adequate housing operate in the same way 
as positive and negative incidents of classical rights. In both cases, we can 
safely say that the (abstract) right (be it classical or social) is being violated.
However, such symmetry breaks down when we focus, not on the 
violation but on the fulfillment of the right. So imagine that the state meets 
a negative incident of a classical right. For example, it abstains from 
censoring the press. In that case, we can plausibly say that the state fulfills 
at least one important, relevant or substantial part of the abstract classical 
right to freedom of speech. And we can plausibly say so even if the state, at 
the same time, fails to fulfill positive incidents of the same classical right, 
say, because it does not promote the public expression of minorities or 
disadvantaged groups. To be sure, we might say that in such case the 
fulfillment of the right to free speech is deficient or insufficient. Still, if the 
state does not actively censor or in any way prohibit or restrict public 
expressions, we would surely conclude that a relevant, substantial, part of 
the right to free speech is being fulfilled. On the contrary, imagine that the 
state meets the negative incidents of a social right: the government does 
not evict persons from their houses or territories. In such case, we may 
think that this is not enough to fulfill the most important, relevant, or 
5  Bilchitz (2007: 91).
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substantial aspect of the social right to adequate housing, in particular 
when the state fails to fulfill the positive incidents of that same social 
right.6 Consider a further example: imagine that the state simply refrains 
from actively obstructing people’s access to nutritious food. Would we say 
that the state is fulfilling the social right to subsistence, in the most relevant 
sense? I think the answer is no. The only way for the state to guarantee the 
satisfaction of the social right to subsistence or adequate housing is to 
actively guarantee that people who lack access to nutritious food or decent 
housing enjoy secure access to the objects of their rights. In other words, 
while in some cases this may turn out to be insufficient, fulfilling just the 
negative incidents of a classical right makes a substantial contribution to 
its satisfaction. Contrariwise, in most relevant cases, fulfilling just the 
negative incidents of a social right makes only a secondary contribution to 
its full satisfaction. In fact, the point and purpose of social rights is to make 
sure that everyone enjoys secure access to their objects.
To illustrate the point, let us take a closer look at the negative incidents 
of social rights. Those incidents are negative rights that can be violated 
(only) by actions. Imagine a community living from fishing at sea (a 
common property). At some point, the government grants a private 
company an exclusive fishing license which deprives the community of its 
only means of subsistence. In such case we could certainly claim that the 
state has actively violated the social right to subsistence.7 The state has 
violated a negative incident of that right by performing an action that 
renders community unable to obtain sufficient food.
Now imagine that at some point the government changes its mind and 
decides to fulfill the community’s social right to subsistence. An obvious 
way of doing so would be to cancel the company’s exclusive license so that 
members of the community can fish again. Since this solution cancels its 
previous active intervention, it restores the fulfillment of the negative 
6  Thomas Pogge would disagree at this point. According to his view, when social 
rights are not fulfilled, the state is violating negative rights, not (just) positive rights (see 
Pogge 2002: 203 ff; Pogge 2011). The correlative duty to that (negative) right is the (negative) 
duty not to impose an unjust institutional scheme that causes social rights to remain 
unfulfilled. I do not want to discuss this view here, but it seems to me that the discussion is 
rather terminological. The important point is whether those duties are DC duties or just 
goals. It seems to me clear that the duty to reduce global poverty is (at least partially) an 
aggregative goal, and the measures that Pogge suggests to achieve that goal (such as his 
“Global Resources Dividend”) is not a DC duty. Proof of that is that we (and Pogge, I assume) 
would not be prepared to defend the Global Resources Dividend if it were foreseeable that, 
while rescuing some people from extreme poverty, it will pull more people into extreme 
poverty. This implies that the duty (and the correlative right) involved in fighting against 
extreme poverty is not a DC, in contrast with what happens with (negative incidents of) 
classical rights. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
7  I thank Julio Montero and Mariano Garreta for this example.
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incident of the right to subsistence. However, there are other options the 
state may try. In this vein, it may choose to transfer money to the victims so 
that they can buy the food they need. Or else, it may directly distribute 
food among the victims. If so, the state is not fulfilling a negative incident 
of the right to adequate food.8 Rather, it is fulfilling the right by undertaking 
a positive action, that is by fulfilling a positive incident of the right. I take 
this to prove that fulfillment of negative incidents are less relevant in the 
case of social rights than in the case of classical ones.
This is not to deny that infringing negative incidents of a social right 
may amount to a very serious wrong. However, my impression is that, in 
such cases, the incident will also constitute an independent negative right 
(or a negative incident of a classical right). To see why, consider a perfect 
and rich libertarian society in which all human needs are satisfied through 
market transactions. If at some point the state starts confiscating some 
people’s food, we would not (primarily) say that the state is violating the 
social right to subsistence, or at least not only that right. Instead, we would 
most likely insist that the state is (primarily) infringing the property rights 
of the victims, that is: a classical right. On the other hand, if the state does 
not intervene and everyone happily satisfies their food needs, we would 
not say that state fulfills the social rights of citizens by omission (say, 
because the state does not coercively stop people from satisfying their 
needs). We would rather say that social rights are spontaneously satisfied 
though not officially guaranteed.
All this shows that there is an asymmetry between the fulfillment of 
classical rights and of social rights. To repeat: the fulfillment of the negative 
incidents of classical rights is a substantial part of their satisfaction, 
whereas the fulfillment of the negative incidents of social rights is much 
less substantial (unless that negative incident has an independent 
justification, for example, as negative incident of a classical right).
4. DC AND CLASSICAL RIGHTS
The claim that rights are DC, or that at least some rights work as DC, is 
admittedly controversial. I do not want to defend that claim here, or the 
associated claim that to qualify as a right (or as a “true” right), any interest or 
claim must have this feature. I want to argue instead that classical rights (or, 
as we will see, at least certain aspects of classical rights) seem to have the 
feature of being DC as defined in the previous section. So let us explore more 
8  Except in the trivial sense that the state is not actively impeding to use the money 
or the food that the very state has provided.
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carefully how the negative and positive incidents of abstract classical human 
rights behave with respect to their having or not having a DC character. 
Negative incidents of classical rights can plausibly be conceived as DC 
rights. The correlative duties of abstention held by state officers not to kill 
or torture, censor the press, persecute religious minorities or specific 
associations, imprison people without trial, or proscribe candidates, are 
duties that the state must (at least in principle) strictly honor irrespective 
of the consequences of honoring them, including the consequences in 
terms of the satisfaction of the very same rights.
It is important to emphasize that what distinguishes classical from 
social rights is not that the former are negative. For as I have explained, 
both classical and social rights involve negative and positive incidents. 
Rather, my point is just that the negative incidents of classical rights can 
plausibly be regarded as DC. This means, again, that the state is not allowed 
to violate the negative incidents of classical rights (in this case, actively) to 
optimize some valuable social goal, including the social goal of optimizing 
the satisfaction of the very classical right in question.
Classical rights, I have assumed, also have positive incidents which call 
for active state policies or allocation of the relevant resources. So the right 
to due process requires that the state spends resources to establish 
impartial courts, jurors, and prosecutors, and to guarantee a public lawyer 
to the defendant. Likewise, the right to democratic participation implies 
that the state must provide resources to organize free elections and 
guarantee polling stations across its territory or jurisdiction, among other 
things.
Assuming that the negative incidents of classical rights are DC rights, 
we can wonder whether the positive incidents of classical rights are DC 
rights as well. The question is not directly relevant to my argument, but it 
merits some attention. Although I have no conclusive views about this 
issue, I am inclined to think that whether the positive incidents of classical 
rights are in fact DC depends on the particularities of the case we consider. 
So let us consider the example of the classical right to a fair trial. This 
abstract human right involves clear negative incidents: the state must 
refrain from actively influencing judges, organizing summary trials that 
violate the right of defense, or coercively preventing the defendant from 
hiring a lawyer. All these negative duties are plausibly DC, which implies 
that the state must respect them even if refusing to do so would bring about 
social benefits, such as that future trials would be more impartial or that 
terrorism would decrease significantly. 
On the other hand, the right to a fair trial also involves some obvious 
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positive incidents: it requires that the state takes over the defense if the 
accused lacks the resources to pay for a lawyer. May this incident count as 
a DC right? Even though the answer is not completely clear to me, it is not 
unreasonable to think that its satisfaction may legitimately factor in 
consequentialist considerations. In such case, the state might be allowed 
refuse to guarantee an official defender if some alternative allocation of 
(scarce) resources (say, redirecting official defenders to some other 
jurisdiction) would optimize this specific aspect of the right to a fair trial. 
Alternatively, it could also be argued that this positive incident (the right to 
a lawyer) is in fact a DC right: if the state is unable to provide the service, 
then the trial should be suspended until it can do so.9 In any case, no 
definitive answer to this controversial issue is necessary for my argument; 
all I need to claim is that negative incidents of classical rights can plausibly 
be conceived as DC rights, whatever we believe about their positive 
incidents.10
In sum: classical rights have both negative and positive incidents. While 
the negative incidents may be plausibly regarded as DC rights, it is unclear 
whether their positive incidents are DC too.
5. DC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
What about social rights? As in the case of the right to a lawyer in a criminal 
trial, there is no conceptual obstacle for a positive right to be a DC. In that 
sense, there is no conceptual impediment for both negative and positive 
incidents of social rights to be DC rights. But conceptual possibility is not 
the same as philosophical plausibility. The key question here is whether 
social rights (as conceived by international human rights conventions) can 
plausibly be considered DC rights equivalent to the negative incidents (and 
perhaps some positive incidents) that classical rights involve. 
There is at least one important positive right that can plausibly be 
conceived as a DC right: the right to be rescued from imminent death. In 
fact, it seems reasonable to claim that we have a moral duty to aid someone 
at dire straits, even if this means that fewer people in a similar situation 
will be rescued. These kinds of normative scenarios are familiar during 
health emergencies: in order to save a child who requires a heart transplant, 
we may need to invest a large amount of money which we will render 
unable to invest in saving many children at risk. If we assume that concrete 
9  I thank Marcelo Alegre for discussion on this point.
10  In fact, the claim that positive incidents of classical rights are DC would support 
my (main) thesis that there is a normative asymmetry between classical and social rights, 
since, as we will see, it is not plausible to take positive incidents of social rights as DC rights.
86 Eduardo Rivera-López 
LEAP 6 (2018)
lives take priority over statistical ones (and I am not saying that this is 
necessarily the case), then it is plausible to conclude that the right to be 
rescued (and the corresponding positive duty to rescue) is a DC.11
Having conceded that positive rights can well be DC, the next question 
is whether positive incidents of social rights (which, if my argument in 
section II is correct, constitute a crucial aspect of social rights) should be 
understood as DC. This is, I insist once more, not a conceptual question, 
but normative one. In other words, the relevant question is whether we are 
prepared to consider all (or most) social rights in the same way as (DC) 
rescue rights (and, of course, as negative incidents of classical rights), 
namely: in a way that implies that we have the obligation to fulfill the social 
right to X in one particular case, even if doing so would reduce the overall 
satisfaction of the social right to X. To anticipate my view: I think this is not 
plausible because social rights are better constructed as mandates to 
optimize certain goals.
Social rights are optimizing mandates in two senses. First, they allow 
for intra-subjective trade-offs. They form an interrelated set of interests, 
the joint satisfaction of which enables the individual to lead a minimally 
satisfactory life. Take the rights to decent housing and to health. It is clear 
that most persons will rationally seek to optimize the joint satisfaction of 
both rights; or else they may decide to give up some degree of satisfaction 
of one of them to increase the satisfaction of the other one. The same is 
true for all social rights. In essence, the substantial normative claim that 
underlies them is the enjoyment the set of goods we need to lead a 
minimally autonomous or dignifying life (let us call this set “basic needs”). 
The state’s correlative duty is an optimization mandate as well, in the sense 
that it requires the provision of that set of goods that allows the optimal 
satisfaction of basic needs. Furthermore, each of the individual duties 
correlative to specific rights (to housing, health, nutritious food and so on) 
stands in some sort or tension or trade-off with the rest. Note that this is 
not the case with classical rights. Even if individuals may rationally want to 
sacrifice a certain degree of freedom of speech or vote in exchange for an 
improved satisfaction of her basic needs (better housing or health care), we 
would not accept that the authorities engage in these kinds of trade-offs.
Social rights are also inter-subjectively optimizing. The aim of social 
rights public polies is to satisfy social rights for an entire population and in 
the long run. This means trying to achieve something like a state of affairs 
in which the satisfaction of basic needs is given to as many people as 
possible, or a state of affairs in which the satisfaction of basic needs of 
11  On the controversy between saving identified versus statistical lives, see Cohen, 
Daniels and Eyal (2015).
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those who are worse off increases to the greatest extent possible, or some 
other optimal state of affairs in terms of justice.
These two optimizing features of social rights do not necessarily imply 
that social rights are not genuine rights. Insofar they can be legitimately 
constructed as priority goals which take care of essential interests, rights 
language is not inadequate. Still, whatever preeminence or importance we 
are willing to give to social rights, it is important to stress that they operate 
as social goals, that is: goals the state must promote according to some 
criterion of justice or efficiency to be optimized through an adequate set of 
public policies. Such policies may be constrained by classical rights, but 
not by the same social rights.
To determine to what extent social rights can be DC, let us briefly 
consider Henry Shue’s discussion of a thesis sustained by Garret Hardin. 
According to Hardin, humanitarian aid to the global poor is self-defeating 
because, given the limited carrying capacity of the planet, it will only 
produce more global poverty in the future (Shue 1980: 97-104). Although 
Hardin’s theory has lost its appeal because it has proven empirically false, 
it is nevertheless interesting as it helps us to test if we we are willing to 
consider the human right to subsistence as a DC it has proven empirically 
false (see Drèze and Sen 1989).
If the social right to subsistence generates a DC duty, then we should 
take action to satisfy it, even if this would undermine its satisfaction for a 
greater number of people in the future. On the other hand, if the social 
right to subsistence only the expresses a principle of justice that seeks to 
minimize (or eradicate) extreme poverty, then we should refrain from 
helping the poor now to avoid more poverty in the future – provided 
Hardin’s thesis were true. Of course this is a false dilemma, but it is 
remarkable that Shue’s discussion focuses primarily on showing that the 
empirical basis of the theory is false, not that we should satisfy the right to 
subsistence regardless of what may happen in the future.12 This does not 
prove that Shue was thinking of social rights as optimizing goals, but it 
suggests he was. And plausibly so. When we think of extreme poverty, our 
concern is to reduce or eradicate poverty, and we are willing to appeal to 
any means to achieve that goal (compatible with the fulfillment of some 
fundamental classical rights). We would not be willing to advance policies 
that, in the name of helping the poor (or satisfying their social rights), increase 
12  “The dilemma suggested by the population objections dissolves entirely, provided 
that in fact poor countries have, or can obtain, means of controlling population growth that 
are compatible with the protection of subsistence rights” (Shue 1980: 101).
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the number of poor people (or the non-satisfaction of their social rights).13
These arguments do not show, as I said at the beginning, that social 
rights cannot be considered human rights. What they show is that social 
rights have a different normative structure vis à vis classical rights. The 
latter have a relevant DC component: we are willing to sacrifice valuable 
social goals (including the satisfaction of classical rights; including the 
satisfaction of that very classical right) to fulfill classical rights in each 
relevant occasion. Social rights, on the other hand, cannot be plausibly 
conceived in this way. I repeat: we would not be willing to allow more 
people to remain in poverty if this were the consequence of actively 
bringing fewer people out of poverty.
6. SOME INSITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The conceptual distinction between liberal and social rights that I explored 
may have significant practical implications in terms of the judicialization 
of social rights, which I will now try to sketch though maintaining a 
considerable level of abstraction. Schematically, there are three kinds of 
procedures judges may use to make a decision in the field of social rights.  
The first kind of decision takes the claim of the right holder as a DC 
right. In the case of classical rights, this is obviously the rule. For example, 
when a judge declares that an act of censorship is unconstitutional and 
cancels the closure of a newspaper, she does so to satisfy the right to free 
speech.  Importantly, the judge’s duty correlates to a DC right, since she is 
not allowed to consider the social consequences of reopening the 
newspaper. Similarly, in the realm of social rights, a judge can order the 
executive to grant a specific indigent family adequate housing or a specific 
patient an expensive medicine.14 In these cases, she follows the same kind 
of reasoning: she is not calculating the burdens and benefits her decision 
may entail for society as a whole. 
A second kind of intervention is familiar in the realm of social rights 
and should not be confused with the first one.15 Suppose there is a 
governmental policy that provides some service to the population, say 
13  In the terminology coined by Guido Pincione and FernandoTesón, publicly 
defending that kind of policy would be a case of “discourse failure” (Pincione and Tesón 
2006: 142 ff.).
14  For example, in Q. C., S. Y. v. Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, a 
judge ordered the government of Buenos Aires to provide adequate housing to an indigent 
family with a disabled child. The decision was reversed by the Superior Court of Buenos 
Aires.
15  Leticia Morales has made me aware of this kind of intervention.
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basic education for every child. Imagine now that one specific child (or set 
of children) is denied the service (for reasons of scarcity or for any other 
reason). In such case, the judge might order the executive to provide the 
service to that particular child (or set of children). In one sense, the 
intervention works as if the child had a DC right to basic education, because 
her claim is taken as a sufficient reason (for the judge) to deliver that order. 
Still, I do not think a DC right to education is necessary involved, but rather 
a DC right to equal treatment. Given that there is a policy providing some 
service, it must be provided to all. Similar examples can be provided for the 
case of health-care services.
Finally, there is a third kind of judicial intervention which is qualitatively 
different in nature. In this kind of case, the judge orders the executive 
simply to deal with housing shortage, or to clean a polluted river, or to 
provide education, or to have some kind of social security plan, etc. So she 
is intervening in public policy in order to promote some valuable social 
goal, such as the goal that no one lacks housing, food or education, or that 
the river is clean. This is the intervention path followed, for instance, by 
the South African Supreme Court in the well-known “Grootboom” and 
“T.A.C.” cases, which required that the government implemented a 
“reasonable” policy to provide adequate housing and essential HIV drugs 
to its population.16 Along the same lines, in the case “Mendoza” the 
Argentine Supreme Court urged the executive to issue an “integrated plan” 
to improve the environmental situation of the polluted river “Riachuelo”.17 
Naturally, I am not claiming that this type of intervention is not justified or 
that the judiciary should not make this kind of decisions; my sole claim is 
rather that this is an essentially different sort of intervention.
From a strictly normative point of view, the relevant question is whether 
the judiciary should intervene only in the first (and the second) way, or we 
want it to intervene in the third way as well. For only the first kind of 
intervention implies granting social rights a DC status. Instead, the second 
one is not essentially about social rights, while third one does not deliver 
on a DC right. 
One relevant conclusion we may draw from the above argument is that 
when courts behave in the third way, they are doing something conceptually 
and normatively different from what they do when they behave in the first 
one. We can of course say that they are enforcing social rights in both 
cases; but they are not doing the exactly same in the most fundamental 
16  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
17  See Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c/Estado Nacional y otros s/daños y perjuicios 
(daños derivados de la contaminación ambiental del Río Matanza-Riachuelo)” (M.1569.XL).
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conceptual sense: whereas in the first case the court is treating the social 
right as a DC right, in the third one, it is treating the social right as a 
normatively prioritarian policy goal (based on considerations of justice).
This being so, we may wonder whether it is normatively acceptable or 
plausible that judges make the first kind of decision, taking (positive 
incidents of) social rights as DC rights (assuming, of course, that we find 
acceptable that they treat negative incidents of classical rights as DC 
rights). I cannot pursue this question here, but I think there are reasons to 
be skeptical. As I mentioned before, taking social rights as DC rights seems 
plausible only in exceptional cases, such as those which involve rescuing 
people from imminent, serious and irreparable harm (typically death). 
Beyond this, judicial intervention to provide specific solutions to specific 
problems (lack of housing, lack of medical care, lack of adequate education, 
etc.) is highly problematic. This is so because fulfilling a certain right (to 
adequate housing or health care, for example) in a particular case fails to 
factor in relevant social consequences; and when these kinds of measures 
are not taken in truly exceptional cases they may end up being detrimental 
to the satisfaction of the very right involved (they result, for instance in less 
people having adequate housing or health services).18 Even though we are 
prepared to face such paradoxical result in the case of classical rights, it is 
much less clear that we want to do so with social ones.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I conclude briefly. I wanted to bring to light a feature that at least some 
essential aspects of classical rights have. My question was whether that 
feature (which I called DC) also operates plausibly in the case of social 
rights. My response was cautiously negative. Conceiving of social rights as 
DC rights might be reasonable in extreme situations or catastrophes, in 
which we have a very strong intuition in favor of saving concrete people 
with partial or total independence of the subsequent consequences of that 
decision. But this conceptual framework is inadequate to think about 
social rights in general, which are rather mandates to satisfy certain 
minimum in the satisfaction of basic needs of the whole population. This 
seems rather a mandate for optimization and, therefore, is qualitatively 
different from what happens with classical rights.
18  This is not just a speculation. See Wang 2015, where Wang describes how courts 
decisions to provide medical treatments to specific persons have become an important 
factor of the health policy in Brazil. Wang very plausibly claims that this has negative 
consequences in terms of distributive justice of the access to health services. The reason is, 
following my terminology, that judges enforce the right to medical treatment as DC rights, 
without looking at the consequences.
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